Incompatible messages implied from positive and negative frames regarding trust and choice decisions

G. Keren

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review


Following common wisdom, if one trusts agent A more than B, then one should prefer to conduct transactions with the former rather than with the latter agent. Several experiments are presented that are incompatible with this conjecture. For example, when faced with a choice between two butchers, whose ground beef is advertised as containing 25% fat (negative frame) or 75% lean (positive frame), respectively (Levin, 1987; Levin and Gaeth, 1988), most people have more trust in the former yet most indicate they would buy their meat from the latter butcher. This phenomenon, in which negative framing weighs more in trust assessments, and positive framing weighs more in choice, is labeled trust – choice incompatibility. The robustness of the phenomenon is further demonstrated in several experiments, and possible explanations for its occurrence are discussed.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the Conference on Advice and Trust in Decision Making (ATDM 2006), June 29-30, 2006
Place of PublicationLondon
PublisherUniversity College London
Publication statusPublished - 2007
Eventconference; ATDM 2006; 2006-06-29; 2006-06-30 -
Duration: 29 Jun 200630 Jun 2006


Conferenceconference; ATDM 2006; 2006-06-29; 2006-06-30
OtherATDM 2006


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