Abstract
In this paper, I consider a form of skepticism that has a permissive conclusion, according to which we are rationally permitted to suspend judgment in an area, or to have beliefs in that area. I argue that such a form of skepticism is resistant to some traditional strategies of refutation. It also carries a benefit, namely that it increases voluntary control over doxastic states by introducing options, and therefore greater freedom, into the realm of belief. I argue that intellectual preferences and dispositions provide decisive reasons that can settle our doxastic states in such cases.
Translated title of the contribution | Freedom through skepticism |
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Original language | Dutch |
Pages (from-to) | 19-36 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte |
Volume | 108 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 28 Feb 2016 |
Keywords
- doxastic voluntarism
- epistemic permissivism
- freedom
- skepticism
- suspension of judgment