Vrijheid door scepticisme

Translated title of the contribution: Freedom through skepticism

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Abstract

In this paper, I consider a form of skepticism that has a permissive conclusion, according to which we are rationally permitted to suspend judgment in an area, or to have beliefs in that area. I argue that such a form of skepticism is resistant to some traditional strategies of refutation. It also carries a benefit, namely that it increases voluntary control over doxastic states by introducing options, and therefore greater freedom, into the realm of belief. I argue that intellectual preferences and dispositions provide decisive reasons that can settle our doxastic states in such cases.
Original languageDutch
Pages (from-to)19-36
Number of pages18
JournalAlgemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte
Volume108
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 28 Feb 2016

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Keywords

  • doxastic voluntarism
  • epistemic permissivism
  • freedom
  • skepticism
  • suspension of judgment

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