Abstract
Receipt-freeness is the property of voting protocols that a
voter cannot create a receipt which proves how she voted. Since Benaloh
and Tuinstra introduced this property, there has been a large amount of
work devoted to the construction of receipt-free voting protocols. This
paper provides a generic and uniform formalism that captures the notion
of a receipt. The formalism is then applied to analyse the receipt-freeness
of a number of voting protocols.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Information Security (Proceedings 9th International Conference, ISC 2006, Samos, Greece, August 30-September 2, 2006) |
| Editors | S.K. Katsikas, J. Lopez, M. Backes, S. Gritzalis, B. Preneel |
| Place of Publication | Berlin |
| Publisher | Springer |
| Pages | 476-488 |
| ISBN (Print) | 3-540-38341-7 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2006 |
Publication series
| Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
|---|---|
| Volume | 4176 |
| ISSN (Print) | 0302-9743 |
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Cite this
Jonker, H. L., & Vink, de, E. P. (2006). Formalising receipt-freeness. In S. K. Katsikas, J. Lopez, M. Backes, S. Gritzalis, & B. Preneel (Eds.), Information Security (Proceedings 9th International Conference, ISC 2006, Samos, Greece, August 30-September 2, 2006) (pp. 476-488). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 4176). Berlin: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/11836810_34