Feasibility of multi-protocol attacks

C.J.F. Cremers

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

36 Citations (Scopus)


Formal modeling and verification of security protocols typically assumes that a protocol is executed in isolation, without other protocols sharing the network. We investigate the existence of multi-protocol attacks on protocols described in literature. Given two or more protocols, that share key structures and are executed in the same environment, are new attacks possible? Out of 30 protocols from literature, we find that 23 are vulnerable to multi-protocol attacks. We identify two likely attack patterns and sketch a tagging scheme to prevent multi-protocol attacks.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the First International Conference in Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES, Vienna, Austria, April 20-22, 2006)
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
ISBN (Print)0-7695-2567-9
Publication statusPublished - 2006


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