Equilibrium strategies for processor sharing and random queues with relative priorities

M. Haviv, J. Wal, van der

Research output: Book/ReportReportAcademic

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Abstract

We consider a memoryless single server queue in which users can purchase relative priority so as to reduce their expected waiting costs which are linear with time. Relative priority is given in proportion to a price paid by customers present in the system. For two service disciplines, (weighted) processor sharing and (weighted) random entrance, we find the unique pure and symmetric Nash equilibrium price paid by the customers.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationEindhoven
PublisherTechnische Universiteit Eindhoven
Number of pages9
Publication statusPublished - 1996

Publication series

NameMemorandum COSOR
Volume9637
ISSN (Print)0926-4493

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