Equilibrium strategies for processor sharing and random queues with relative priorities

M. Haviv, J. Wal, van der

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

    27 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    We consider a memoryless single-server queue in which users can purchase relative priority so as to reduce their expected waiting costs, which are linear with time. Relative priority is given in proportion to a price paid by customers present in the system. For two service disciplines, (weighted) processor sharing and (weighted) random entrance, we find the unique pure and symmetric Nash equilibrium price paid by the customers.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)403-412
    Number of pages10
    JournalProbability in the Engineering and Informational Sciences
    Volume11
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1997

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