Equilibrium strategies for processor sharing and random queues with relative priorities

M. Haviv, J. Wal, van der

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

27 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider a memoryless single-server queue in which users can purchase relative priority so as to reduce their expected waiting costs, which are linear with time. Relative priority is given in proportion to a price paid by customers present in the system. For two service disciplines, (weighted) processor sharing and (weighted) random entrance, we find the unique pure and symmetric Nash equilibrium price paid by the customers.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)403-412
Number of pages10
JournalProbability in the Engineering and Informational Sciences
Volume11
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1997

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