Dispositions, causes, persistence as is, and general relativity

J.K. Katzav

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)
102 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

I argue that, on a dispositionalist account of causation and indeed on any other view of causation according to which causation is a real relation, general relativity (GR) does not give causal principles a role in explaining phenomena. In doing so, I bring out a surprisingly substantial constraint on adequate views about the explanations and ontology of GR, namely the requirement that such views show how GR can explain motion that is free of disturbing influences.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)41-57
Number of pages18
JournalInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science
Volume27
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013

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