Differential attack on five rounds of the SC2000 block cipher

J. Lu

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

SC2000 is a 128-bit block cipher with a user key of 128, 192 or 256 bits, which employs a total of 6.5 rounds if a 128-bit user key is used. It is a CRYPTREC recommended e-government cipher. In this paper we describe one 4.75-round differential characteristic with probability $2^{126}$ of SC2000 and thirty 4.75-round differential characteristics with probability $2^{¿127}$. Finally, we exploit these 4.75-round differentials to conduct a differential cryptanalysis attack on a 5-round reduced version of SC2000 when used with a 128-bit key. The attack suggests for the first time that the safety margin of SC2000 with a 128-bit key decreases below one and a half rounds.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInformation Security and Cryptology (5th International Conference, Inscrypt 2009, Beijing, China, December 12-15, 2009. Revised Selected Papers)
EditorsF. Bao, M. Yung
Place of PublicationBerlin
PublisherSpringer
Pages50-59
ISBN (Print)978-3-642-16341-8
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2010

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
Volume6151
ISSN (Print)0302-9743

Cite this

Lu, J. (2010). Differential attack on five rounds of the SC2000 block cipher. In F. Bao, & M. Yung (Eds.), Information Security and Cryptology (5th International Conference, Inscrypt 2009, Beijing, China, December 12-15, 2009. Revised Selected Papers) (pp. 50-59). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 6151). Berlin: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16342-5_4