Abstract
In a software system it is possible to quantify the amount of information that is leaked or corrupted by analysing the flows of information present in the source code. In a cyber-physical system, information flows are not only present at the digital level but also at a physical level, and they are also present to and fro the two levels. In this work, we provide a methodology to formally analyse a composite, cyber-physical system model (combining physics and control) using an information flow-theoretic approach. We use this approach to quantify the level of vulnerability of a system with respect to attackers with different capabilities. We illustrate our approach by means of a water distribution case study.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | PLAS 2017 - Proceedings of the 2017 Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security, co-located with CCS 2017 |
| Place of Publication | New York |
| Publisher | Association for Computing Machinery, Inc. |
| Pages | 63–74 |
| Number of pages | 12 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781450350990 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Oct 2017 |
| Externally published | Yes |
| Event | PLAS '17: Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security - Dallas, United States Duration: 30 Oct 2017 → 30 Oct 2017 |
Conference
| Conference | PLAS '17: Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security |
|---|---|
| Country/Territory | United States |
| City | Dallas |
| Period | 30/10/17 → 30/10/17 |
Keywords
- Control theory
- Cyber-physical systems
- Information flow
- Noninterference
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