Abstract
In a software system it is possible to quantify the amount of information that is leaked or corrupted by analysing the flows of information present in the source code. In a cyber-physical system, information flows are not only present at the digital level but also at a physical level, and they are also present to and fro the two levels. In this work, we provide a methodology to formally analyse a composite, cyber-physical system model (combining physics and control) using an information flow-theoretic approach. We use this approach to quantify the level of vulnerability of a system with respect to attackers with different capabilities. We illustrate our approach by means of a water distribution case study.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | PLAS 2017 - Proceedings of the 2017 Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security, co-located with CCS 2017 |
Place of Publication | New York |
Publisher | Association for Computing Machinery, Inc |
Pages | 63–74 |
Number of pages | 12 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781450350990 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Oct 2017 |
Externally published | Yes |
Event | PLAS '17: Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security - Dallas, United States Duration: 30 Oct 2017 → 30 Oct 2017 |
Conference
Conference | PLAS '17: Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security |
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Country/Territory | United States |
City | Dallas |
Period | 30/10/17 → 30/10/17 |
Keywords
- Control theory
- Cyber-physical systems
- Information flow
- Noninterference