Cusum and chi-squared attack detection of compromised sensors

C.G. Murguia Rendon; Justin Ruths

doi:10.1109/CCA.2016.7587875

Cusum and chi-squared attack detection of compromised sensors

C.G. Murguia Rendon, Justin Ruths

Dynamics and Control

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Academic › peer-review

71 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A vector-valued model-based cumulative sum (CUSUM) procedure is proposed for identifying falsified sensor measurements. To fulfill a desired detection performance, given the system dynamics, we derive tools for tuning the CUSUM procedure. We characterize the state degradation that a stealthy attacker can induce to the system while remaining undetected by the detection procedure. We quantify the advantage of using a dynamic detector (CUSUM), which leverages the history of the state, over a static detector (chi-squared) which uses a single measurement at a time. Simulation experiments are presented to illustrate the performance of the detection scheme.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	IEEE Conference on Control Technology and Applications (CCTA)
Publisher	IEEE Press
Pages	474-480
Number of pages	7
ISBN (Electronic)	978-1-5090-0755-4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/CCA.2016.7587875
Publication status	Published - 13 Oct 2016
Event	2016 IEEE Conference on Control Applications, CCA 2016 - Buenos Aires, Argentina, Buenos Aires, Argentina Duration: 19 Sept 2016 → 22 Sept 2016 http://www.msc2016.org/

Conference

Conference	2016 IEEE Conference on Control Applications, CCA 2016
Abbreviated title	CCA2016
Country/Territory	Argentina
City	Buenos Aires
Period	19/09/16 → 22/09/16
Internet address	http://www.msc2016.org/

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10.1109/CCA.2016.7587875

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title = "Cusum and chi-squared attack detection of compromised sensors",

abstract = "A vector-valued model-based cumulative sum (CUSUM) procedure is proposed for identifying falsified sensor measurements. To fulfill a desired detection performance, given the system dynamics, we derive tools for tuning the CUSUM procedure. We characterize the state degradation that a stealthy attacker can induce to the system while remaining undetected by the detection procedure. We quantify the advantage of using a dynamic detector (CUSUM), which leverages the history of the state, over a static detector (chi-squared) which uses a single measurement at a time. Simulation experiments are presented to illustrate the performance of the detection scheme.",

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N2 - A vector-valued model-based cumulative sum (CUSUM) procedure is proposed for identifying falsified sensor measurements. To fulfill a desired detection performance, given the system dynamics, we derive tools for tuning the CUSUM procedure. We characterize the state degradation that a stealthy attacker can induce to the system while remaining undetected by the detection procedure. We quantify the advantage of using a dynamic detector (CUSUM), which leverages the history of the state, over a static detector (chi-squared) which uses a single measurement at a time. Simulation experiments are presented to illustrate the performance of the detection scheme.

AB - A vector-valued model-based cumulative sum (CUSUM) procedure is proposed for identifying falsified sensor measurements. To fulfill a desired detection performance, given the system dynamics, we derive tools for tuning the CUSUM procedure. We characterize the state degradation that a stealthy attacker can induce to the system while remaining undetected by the detection procedure. We quantify the advantage of using a dynamic detector (CUSUM), which leverages the history of the state, over a static detector (chi-squared) which uses a single measurement at a time. Simulation experiments are presented to illustrate the performance of the detection scheme.

U2 - 10.1109/CCA.2016.7587875

DO - 10.1109/CCA.2016.7587875

M3 - Conference contribution

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BT - IEEE Conference on Control Technology and Applications (CCTA)

PB - IEEE Press

T2 - 2016 IEEE Conference on Control Applications, CCA 2016

Y2 - 19 September 2016 through 22 September 2016

ER -

Cusum and chi-squared attack detection of compromised sensors

Abstract

Conference

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