Core stability in hedonic coalition formation

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

29 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In many economic, social and political situations individuals carry out activities in groups (coalitions) rather than alone and on their own. Examples range from households and sport clubs to research networks, political parties and trade unions. The underlying game theoretic framework is known as coalition formation. This survey discusses the notion of core stability in hedonic coalition formation (where each player’s happiness only depends on the other members of his coalition but not on how the remaining players outside his coalition are grouped). We present the central concepts and algorithmic approaches in the area, provide many examples, and pose a number of open problems.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSOFSEM 2013: Theory and Practice of Computer Science (39th International Conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science, Špindlerův Mlýn, Czech Republic, January 26-31, 2013. Proceedings)
EditorsP. Emde Boas, van, F.C.A. Groen, G.F. Italiano, J. Nawrocki, H. Sack
Place of PublicationBerlin
PublisherSpringer
Pages33-50
ISBN (Print)978-3-642-35842-5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013
Event39th International Conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science (SOFSEM 2013) - Špindlerův Mlýn, Czech Republic
Duration: 26 Jan 201331 Jan 2013
Conference number: 39

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
Volume7741
ISSN (Print)0302-9743

Conference

Conference39th International Conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science (SOFSEM 2013)
Abbreviated titleSOFSEM 2013
CountryCzech Republic
CityŠpindlerův Mlýn
Period26/01/1331/01/13

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