Compositional methods for information-hiding

C. Braun, K. Chatzikokolakis, C. Palamidessi

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

    25 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Protocols for information-hiding often use randomized primitives to obfuscate the link between the observables and the information to be protected. The degree of protection provided by a protocol can be expressed in terms of the probability of error associated to the inference of the secret information.

    We consider a probabilistic process calculus approach to the specification of such protocols, and we study how the operators affect the probability of error. In particular, we characterize constructs that have the property of not decreasing the degree of protection, and that can therefore be considered safe in the modular construction of protocols.

    As a case study, we apply these techniques to the Dining Cryptographers, and we are able to derive a generalization of Chaum’s strong anonymity result.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationFoundations of Software Science and Computational Structures
    Subtitle of host publication11th International Conference, FOSSACS 2008, Held as Part of the Joint European Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2008, Budapest, Hungary, March 29 - April 6, 2008. Proceedings
    EditorsR. Amadio
    Place of PublicationBerlin
    PublisherSpringer
    Chapter31
    Pages443-457
    Number of pages15
    ISBN (Electronic)978-3-540-78499-9
    ISBN (Print)978-3-540-78497-5
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2008

    Publication series

    NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)
    Volume4962
    ISSN (Print)0302-9743

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