Combined bidding at power and ancillary service markets

A. Virag, A. Jokic, R.M. Hermans, P.P.J. Bosch, van den

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)
5 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Power and ancillary service markets are strongly coupled. However, at the moment auctions are organized in such a manner that the coupling is not taken into account. Every market participant submits bids at power and/or AS markets without possibility to adjust with respect to the outcome of the other market. Inexact approximations of the actual market price induce deviations from the optimal social welfare value. In this paper, we firstly describe and analyze the consequences of power and ancillary service market coupling. Secondly, we present two different market design strategies, both of which are based on the idea of iterative auction and have the goal to optimally account for power and AS coupling, enabling the overall system to maximize its social welfare. An illustrative example is used to present potential benefits and downsides that might arise as a result of introducing proposed market arrangements.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 8th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM 2011), 25-27 May 2011, Zagreb, Croatia
Place of PublicationPiscataway
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
Pages568-573
ISBN (Print)8-1-61284-285-1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2011
Event8th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM 2011) - Zagreb, Croatia
Duration: 25 May 201127 May 2011
Conference number: 8
http://www.eem11.com/

Conference

Conference8th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM 2011)
Abbreviated titleEEM 2011
CountryCroatia
CityZagreb
Period25/05/1127/05/11
Internet address

Cite this

Virag, A., Jokic, A., Hermans, R. M., & Bosch, van den, P. P. J. (2011). Combined bidding at power and ancillary service markets. In Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM 2011), 25-27 May 2011, Zagreb, Croatia (pp. 568-573). Piscataway: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. https://doi.org/10.1109/EEM.2011.5953076
Virag, A. ; Jokic, A. ; Hermans, R.M. ; Bosch, van den, P.P.J. / Combined bidding at power and ancillary service markets. Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM 2011), 25-27 May 2011, Zagreb, Croatia. Piscataway : Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2011. pp. 568-573
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Virag, A, Jokic, A, Hermans, RM & Bosch, van den, PPJ 2011, Combined bidding at power and ancillary service markets. in Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM 2011), 25-27 May 2011, Zagreb, Croatia. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Piscataway, pp. 568-573, 8th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM 2011), Zagreb, Croatia, 25/05/11. https://doi.org/10.1109/EEM.2011.5953076

Combined bidding at power and ancillary service markets. / Virag, A.; Jokic, A.; Hermans, R.M.; Bosch, van den, P.P.J.

Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM 2011), 25-27 May 2011, Zagreb, Croatia. Piscataway : Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2011. p. 568-573.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

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N2 - Power and ancillary service markets are strongly coupled. However, at the moment auctions are organized in such a manner that the coupling is not taken into account. Every market participant submits bids at power and/or AS markets without possibility to adjust with respect to the outcome of the other market. Inexact approximations of the actual market price induce deviations from the optimal social welfare value. In this paper, we firstly describe and analyze the consequences of power and ancillary service market coupling. Secondly, we present two different market design strategies, both of which are based on the idea of iterative auction and have the goal to optimally account for power and AS coupling, enabling the overall system to maximize its social welfare. An illustrative example is used to present potential benefits and downsides that might arise as a result of introducing proposed market arrangements.

AB - Power and ancillary service markets are strongly coupled. However, at the moment auctions are organized in such a manner that the coupling is not taken into account. Every market participant submits bids at power and/or AS markets without possibility to adjust with respect to the outcome of the other market. Inexact approximations of the actual market price induce deviations from the optimal social welfare value. In this paper, we firstly describe and analyze the consequences of power and ancillary service market coupling. Secondly, we present two different market design strategies, both of which are based on the idea of iterative auction and have the goal to optimally account for power and AS coupling, enabling the overall system to maximize its social welfare. An illustrative example is used to present potential benefits and downsides that might arise as a result of introducing proposed market arrangements.

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Virag A, Jokic A, Hermans RM, Bosch, van den PPJ. Combined bidding at power and ancillary service markets. In Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM 2011), 25-27 May 2011, Zagreb, Croatia. Piscataway: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. 2011. p. 568-573 https://doi.org/10.1109/EEM.2011.5953076