Combined bidding at power and ancillary service markets

A. Virag; A. Jokic; R.M. Hermans; P.P.J. Bosch, van den

doi:10.1109/EEM.2011.5953076

Combined bidding at power and ancillary service markets

A. Virag, A. Jokic, R.M. Hermans, P.P.J. Bosch, van den

Control Systems

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Academic › peer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)

5 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Power and ancillary service markets are strongly coupled. However, at the moment auctions are organized in such a manner that the coupling is not taken into account. Every market participant submits bids at power and/or AS markets without possibility to adjust with respect to the outcome of the other market. Inexact approximations of the actual market price induce deviations from the optimal social welfare value. In this paper, we firstly describe and analyze the consequences of power and ancillary service market coupling. Secondly, we present two different market design strategies, both of which are based on the idea of iterative auction and have the goal to optimally account for power and AS coupling, enabling the overall system to maximize its social welfare. An illustrative example is used to present potential benefits and downsides that might arise as a result of introducing proposed market arrangements.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM 2011), 25-27 May 2011, Zagreb, Croatia
Place of Publication	Piscataway
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
Pages	568-573
ISBN (Print)	8-1-61284-285-1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/EEM.2011.5953076
Publication status	Published - 2011
Event	8th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM 2011) - Zagreb, Croatia Duration: 25 May 2011 → 27 May 2011 Conference number: 8 http://www.eem11.com/

Conference

Conference	8th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM 2011)
Abbreviated title	EEM 2011
Country/Territory	Croatia
City	Zagreb
Period	25/05/11 → 27/05/11
Internet address	http://www.eem11.com/

Access to Document

10.1109/EEM.2011.5953076

Cite this

@inproceedings{e3c1c148ddb7400ab4f072a1d52c8575,

title = "Combined bidding at power and ancillary service markets",

abstract = "Power and ancillary service markets are strongly coupled. However, at the moment auctions are organized in such a manner that the coupling is not taken into account. Every market participant submits bids at power and/or AS markets without possibility to adjust with respect to the outcome of the other market. Inexact approximations of the actual market price induce deviations from the optimal social welfare value. In this paper, we firstly describe and analyze the consequences of power and ancillary service market coupling. Secondly, we present two different market design strategies, both of which are based on the idea of iterative auction and have the goal to optimally account for power and AS coupling, enabling the overall system to maximize its social welfare. An illustrative example is used to present potential benefits and downsides that might arise as a result of introducing proposed market arrangements.",

author = "A. Virag and A. Jokic and R.M. Hermans and {Bosch, van den}, P.P.J.",

year = "2011",

doi = "10.1109/EEM.2011.5953076",

language = "English",

isbn = "8-1-61284-285-1",

pages = "568--573",

booktitle = "Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM 2011), 25-27 May 2011, Zagreb, Croatia",

publisher = "Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers",

address = "United States",

note = "8th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM 2011), EEM 2011 ; Conference date: 25-05-2011 Through 27-05-2011",

url = " http://www.eem11.com/",

}

Virag, A, Jokic, A, Hermans, RM & Bosch, van den, PPJ 2011, Combined bidding at power and ancillary service markets. in Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM 2011), 25-27 May 2011, Zagreb, Croatia. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Piscataway, pp. 568-573, 8th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM 2011), Zagreb, Croatia, 25/05/11. https://doi.org/10.1109/EEM.2011.5953076

Combined bidding at power and ancillary service markets. / Virag, A.; Jokic, A.; Hermans, R.M. et al.
Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM 2011), 25-27 May 2011, Zagreb, Croatia. Piscataway: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2011. p. 568-573.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Academic › peer-review

TY - GEN

T1 - Combined bidding at power and ancillary service markets

AU - Virag, A.

AU - Jokic, A.

AU - Hermans, R.M.

AU - Bosch, van den, P.P.J.

N1 - Conference code: 8

PY - 2011

Y1 - 2011

N2 - Power and ancillary service markets are strongly coupled. However, at the moment auctions are organized in such a manner that the coupling is not taken into account. Every market participant submits bids at power and/or AS markets without possibility to adjust with respect to the outcome of the other market. Inexact approximations of the actual market price induce deviations from the optimal social welfare value. In this paper, we firstly describe and analyze the consequences of power and ancillary service market coupling. Secondly, we present two different market design strategies, both of which are based on the idea of iterative auction and have the goal to optimally account for power and AS coupling, enabling the overall system to maximize its social welfare. An illustrative example is used to present potential benefits and downsides that might arise as a result of introducing proposed market arrangements.

AB - Power and ancillary service markets are strongly coupled. However, at the moment auctions are organized in such a manner that the coupling is not taken into account. Every market participant submits bids at power and/or AS markets without possibility to adjust with respect to the outcome of the other market. Inexact approximations of the actual market price induce deviations from the optimal social welfare value. In this paper, we firstly describe and analyze the consequences of power and ancillary service market coupling. Secondly, we present two different market design strategies, both of which are based on the idea of iterative auction and have the goal to optimally account for power and AS coupling, enabling the overall system to maximize its social welfare. An illustrative example is used to present potential benefits and downsides that might arise as a result of introducing proposed market arrangements.

U2 - 10.1109/EEM.2011.5953076

DO - 10.1109/EEM.2011.5953076

M3 - Conference contribution

SN - 8-1-61284-285-1

SP - 568

EP - 573

BT - Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM 2011), 25-27 May 2011, Zagreb, Croatia

PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

CY - Piscataway

T2 - 8th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM 2011)

Y2 - 25 May 2011 through 27 May 2011

ER -

Combined bidding at power and ancillary service markets

Abstract

Conference

Access to Document

Fingerprint

Cite this