TY - BOOK
T1 - Axiomatising Nash-consistent Coalition Logic
AU - Hansen, H.H.
AU - Pauly, M.
PY - 2002
Y1 - 2002
N2 - Abstract:
We add a rule for Nash-consistency to Coalition Logic, a modal logic
for reasoning about the abilities and rights of groups in multi-agent
systems. Rights of agents (constitutions) can be formalised using
Coalition Logic, and the additional inference rule of Nash-consistency
will guarantee that any multi-agent system implementing these rights
will be stable, i.e., for any preferences the agents might have, there
will be rights they can exercise such that no individual deviation
will be profitable. We apply this logic to obtain a formal analysis of
Gibbard's paradox, and we provide meta-theoretic results, in
particular a complete axiomatisation.
Keywords: modal logic, game theory, social choice theory
AB - Abstract:
We add a rule for Nash-consistency to Coalition Logic, a modal logic
for reasoning about the abilities and rights of groups in multi-agent
systems. Rights of agents (constitutions) can be formalised using
Coalition Logic, and the additional inference rule of Nash-consistency
will guarantee that any multi-agent system implementing these rights
will be stable, i.e., for any preferences the agents might have, there
will be rights they can exercise such that no individual deviation
will be profitable. We apply this logic to obtain a formal analysis of
Gibbard's paradox, and we provide meta-theoretic results, in
particular a complete axiomatisation.
Keywords: modal logic, game theory, social choice theory
M3 - Report
T3 - Prepublication Series
BT - Axiomatising Nash-consistent Coalition Logic
PB - Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC), University of Amsterdam
CY - Amsterdam
ER -