For large security systems a clear separation of concerns is achieved through architecting. Particularly the dynamic consistency between the architectural components should be addressed, in addition to individual component behaviour. In this paper, relevant dynamic consistency is specified through Paradigm, a coordination modeling language based on dynamic constraints. As it is argued, this fits well with security issues. A smaller example introduces the architectural approach towards implementing security policies. A larger casestudy illustrates the use of Paradigm in analyzing the FOO voting scheme. In addition, translating the Paradigm models into process algebra brings model checking within reach. Security properties of the examples discussed, are formally verified with the model checker mCRL2.
|Title of host publication||Architecting Dependable Systems VI|
|Editors||R. Lemos, de, J.C. Fabre, C. Gacek, F. Gadducci, M. Beek, ter|
|Place of Publication||Berlin|
|Publication status||Published - 2009|
|Name||Lecture notes in computer science|
Andova, S., Groenewegen, L. P. J., Verschuren, J. H. S., & Vink, de, E. P. (2009). Architecting security with Paradigm. In R. Lemos, de, J. C. Fabre, C. Gacek, F. Gadducci, & M. Beek, ter (Eds.), Architecting Dependable Systems VI (pp. 255-283). (Lecture notes in computer science; Vol. 5835). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10248-6_11