Antidumping duties, undertakings and foreign direct investment in the EU

R.A. Belderbos, H. Vandenbussche, R. Veugelers

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

16 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study the effects of EU antidumping policy when foreign firms can ‘jump’ antidumping duties through foreign direct investment (FDI) in the EU. We show that duty jumping or duty pre-empting FDI occurs if the EU administration has broader objectives than protecting EU industry's profitability and if cost advantages of foreign firms are transferable abroad. The (expectation of) price undertakings reduces the incentives to engage in FDI and may even discourage FDI as long as products are not too differentiated. The results are consistent with recent empirical findings on antidumping jumping FDI.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)429-453
JournalEuropean Economic Review
Volume48
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2004

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Foreign direct investment
Antidumping duties
Foreign firms
Costs
Industry profitability
Jump
Incentives

Cite this

Belderbos, R.A. ; Vandenbussche, H. ; Veugelers, R. / Antidumping duties, undertakings and foreign direct investment in the EU. In: European Economic Review. 2004 ; Vol. 48, No. 2. pp. 429-453.
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Antidumping duties, undertakings and foreign direct investment in the EU. / Belderbos, R.A.; Vandenbussche, H.; Veugelers, R.

In: European Economic Review, Vol. 48, No. 2, 2004, p. 429-453.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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