Anonymity protocols as noisy channels

K. Chatzikokolakis, C. Palamidessi, P. Panangaden

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

    26 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    We propose a framework in which anonymity protocols are interpreted as particular kinds of channels, and the degree of anonymity provided by the protocol as the converse of the channel’s capacity. We also investigate how the adversary can test the system to try to infer the user’s identity, and we study how his probability of success depends on the characteristics of the channel. We then illustrate how various notions of anonymity can be expressed in this framework, and show the relation with some definitions of probabilistic anonymity in literature.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationTrustworthy global computing : second symposium, TGC 2006, Lucca, Italy, November 7-9, 2006 : revised selected papers)
    EditorsU. Montanari, D. Sannella, R. Bruni
    Place of PublicationBerlin
    PublisherSpringer
    Pages281-300
    ISBN (Print)978-3-540-75333-9
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2006

    Publication series

    NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
    Volume4661
    ISSN (Print)0302-9743

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