A reaction attack against cryptosystems based on LRPC codes

Simona Samardjiska, Paolo Santini, Edoardo Persichetti, Gustavo Banegas

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Abstract

Rank metric is a very promising research direction for code-based cryptography. In fact, thanks to the high complexity of generic decoding attacks against codes in this metric, it is possible to easily select parameters that yield very small data sizes. In this paper we analyze cryptosystems based on Low-Rank Parity-Check (LRPC) codes, one of the classes of codes that are efficiently decodable in the rank metric. We show how to exploit the decoding failure rate, which is an inherent feature of these codes, to devise a reaction attack aimed at recovering the private key. As a case study, we cryptanalyze the recent McNie submission to NIST's Post-Quantum Standardization process. Additionally, we provide details of a simple implementation to validate our approach.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProgress in Cryptology – LATINCRYPT 2019 - 6th International Conference on Cryptology and Information Security in Latin America, Proceedings
EditorsPeter Schwabe, Nicolas Thériault
Place of PublicationCham
PublisherSpringer
Pages197-216
Number of pages20
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-030-30530-7
ISBN (Print)978-3-030-30529-1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
PublisherSpringerLink
Volume11774

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Samardjiska, S., Santini, P., Persichetti, E., & Banegas, G. (2019). A reaction attack against cryptosystems based on LRPC codes. In P. Schwabe, & N. Thériault (Eds.), Progress in Cryptology – LATINCRYPT 2019 - 6th International Conference on Cryptology and Information Security in Latin America, Proceedings (pp. 197-216). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 11774). Cham: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30530-7_10