A one-stage model of link formation and payoff division

M. Slikker, C.G.A.M. Nouweland, van den

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

32 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper we introduce a strategic form model in which cooperation structures and divisions of the payoffs are determined simultaneously. We analyze the cooperation structures and payoff divisions that result according to Nash equilibria, strong Nash equilibria, and coalition proof Nash equilibria. We find that no cycle will be formed if a player claims a positive amount for the formation of one of its links and that a player does not necessarily profit from a central position in a cooperation structure.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)153-175
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume34
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2001

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