A one-stage model of link formation and payoff division

M. Slikker; C.G.A.M. Nouweland, van den

doi:10.1006/game.1999.0785

A one-stage model of link formation and payoff division

M. Slikker, C.G.A.M. Nouweland, van den

Operations Planning Accounting & Control

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

34 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper we introduce a strategic form model in which cooperation structures and divisions of the payoffs are determined simultaneously. We analyze the cooperation structures and payoff divisions that result according to Nash equilibria, strong Nash equilibria, and coalition proof Nash equilibria. We find that no cycle will be formed if a player claims a positive amount for the formation of one of its links and that a player does not necessarily profit from a central position in a cooperation structure.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	153-175
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	34
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0785
Publication status	Published - 2001

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abstract = "In this paper we introduce a strategic form model in which cooperation structures and divisions of the payoffs are determined simultaneously. We analyze the cooperation structures and payoff divisions that result according to Nash equilibria, strong Nash equilibria, and coalition proof Nash equilibria. We find that no cycle will be formed if a player claims a positive amount for the formation of one of its links and that a player does not necessarily profit from a central position in a cooperation structure.",

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AB - In this paper we introduce a strategic form model in which cooperation structures and divisions of the payoffs are determined simultaneously. We analyze the cooperation structures and payoff divisions that result according to Nash equilibria, strong Nash equilibria, and coalition proof Nash equilibria. We find that no cycle will be formed if a player claims a positive amount for the formation of one of its links and that a player does not necessarily profit from a central position in a cooperation structure.

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JO - Games and Economic Behavior

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A one-stage model of link formation and payoff division

Abstract

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