Abstract
As more attention is paid to security in the context of control systems
and as attacks occur to real control systems throughout the world, it
has become clear that some of the most nefarious attacks are those that
evade detection. The term stealthy has come to encompass a variety of
techniques that attackers can employ to avoid detection. Here we show
how the states of the system (in particular, the reachable set
corresponding to the attack) can be manipulated under two important
types of stealthy attacks. We employ the chi-squared fault detection
method and demonstrate how this imposes a constraint on the attack
sequence either to generate no alarms (zero-alarm attack) or to generate
alarms at a rate indistinguishable from normal operation (hidden
attack).
Original language | English |
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Article number | 1710.02597v1 |
Number of pages | 8 |
Journal | arXiv |
Publication status | Published - 1 Oct 2017 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Computer Science - Systems and Control
- Mathematics - Dynamical Systems
- Mathematics - Optimization and Control